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INTRODUCTION 
The ongoing debt difficulties faced by multiple countries across the globe 
highlight the pressing need to improve sovereign debt restructuring practices.  
Major international institutions have recognized this need—the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) has undertaken a review of its practices in this arena; the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has 
engaged in extensive discussions with a view to bettering the current system; 
and the UN General Assembly addressed the topic through important 
resolutions in each of the last two years. 
In light of this recent activity, this special issue of YJIL Online is 
especially timely, as it focuses on the applicability and ramifications of the 
“incremental approach” advocated by the UN General Assembly Resolutions 
and the UNCTAD Roadmap.1  My contribution examines two of the Basic 
Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Process adopted by the UN General 
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 1. See Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Matthias Goldmann, An Incremental Approach to 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Sovereign Debt Sustainability as a Principle of International Law, in this 
issue. 
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Assembly: legitimacy and impartiality.2  It goes beyond the necessarily brief 
formulations of the GA-approved Principles themselves to ask several key 
background questions: How can these concepts be understood and why do they 
deserve greater consideration in future debt restructurings?  To what degree are 
these principles already present in parallel domestic and transnational regimes 
in ways that might be useful for thinking through sovereign debt restructuring 
itself?  Drawing from a recently published longer article, I contend that actors 
involved in sovereign debt should more deliberately attend to these principles 
in the future in order to improve restructuring outcomes and garner the stable 
and long-term adherence of global stakeholders.3 
This paper will first point out the possible instrumental value of adhering 
to these principles, particularly in helping to minimize the disruption inherent 
to debt restructurings.  It will then introduce more fully the concepts of 
legitimacy and impartiality, laying out different schools of thought on the 
characteristics of legitimate and impartial orders and briefly highlighting how 
these elements could inform current practice.  Finally, it considers how national 
and transnational institutions analogous to debt restructuring have attempted to 
meet these standards, focusing on domestic insolvency procedures and 
investment treaty arbitration.  This Essay concludes that, despite the variation 
in their institutional manifestations, both legitimacy and impartiality are 
cognizable as foundational principles for future restructurings.  While complete 
attentiveness to all of these features might not be pragmatically feasible, the 
UN General Assembly Resolutions and the UNCTAD Roadmap are right to 
emphasize the centrality of these principles for the sovereign debt regime going 
forward. 
I.  THE INSTRUMENTAL VALUE OF LEGITIMACY AND IMPARTIALITY 
While many global stakeholders no doubt consider legitimacy and 
impartiality to be important values or goals in their own right, not everyone will 
necessarily subscribe to this view.  Why would it matter, on the ground, 
whether a sovereign state’s debt restructuring is considered legitimate or 
impartial?  What might perceptions of legitimacy or impartiality do for any 
given sovereign debt restructuring, such that these concepts deserve inclusion 
in an international statement of principles on the topic? 
It is clear that a restructuring can be a fairly traumatic economic, social, 
and political event in the life of a country.  While it should ideally offer 
financial relief in the form of extended payment schedules or a debt write-
down, the process also can entail a fiscal consolidation that results in cuts to 
government programs and other austerity measures.  Setting aside for now the 
 
 2. UN General Assembly Resolution 69/319 of 10 September 2015, principles 4 and 7. 
 3. This contribution is based on and excerpts a much more extensive article recently 
published, Odette Lienau, The Challenge of Legitimacy in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 57 HARV. 
INT’L L. J. 151-214 (Winter 2016).  The longer piece extends the themes outlined here, applies them to 
historical debt practices and recent policy proposals, and considers the political tensions and 
distributional ramifications implicated in the discussion.  I thank the guest editors of this YJIL Online 
issue for inviting me to contribute to this symposium, the YJIL Online editors for their excellent work 
on this essay, and the editors of the Harvard International Law Journal for their work on the earlier 
article. 
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question of when such measures can become counterproductive, these policies 
often have significant domestic distributional ramifications, and the resulting 
anger may erupt in economically and politically disruptive ways.4  While 
entirely understandable, this second-order disruption can add to and extend the 
distress and sacrifice already generated by the restructuring itself. 
How do legitimacy and impartiality play into this dynamic?  
Understanding impartiality as a component of legitimacy for now, perhaps the 
unique feature of institutions or rules that are considered legitimate is their 
ability to encourage voluntary compliance—to command a higher degree of 
support or acquiescence than might otherwise exist in the absence of coercion 
or self-interest.5  A procedure perceived to be more legitimate and impartial 
could thus encourage a greater willingness on the part of domestic groups to 
engage in consensual restructuring processes and then implement the resulting 
agreements with relative equanimity, thereby minimizing the second-order 
disruptions that can accompany a restructuring.  Of course, this is hardly to 
deny that the anger arising out of debt restructuring is frequently justified, and 
that it can direct attention to important power imbalances both domestically and 
internationally.  But if a consensual debt workout frequently is the right choice, 
then we should strive to identify mechanisms that restructure debt in a smooth, 
efficient, and minimally disruptive manner.  And, of course, this instrumental 
value of legitimacy only supports the inherent value—recognized by many—of 
institutions that enable individuals and groups to comply with agreements as a 
result of considered choice rather than perceived duress or coercion. 
All that said, a number of tensions and difficulties immediately emerge 
with an explicit focus on legitimacy and impartiality, particularly given that the 
concepts can mean different things to different people.  Claiming legitimacy or 
impartiality on behalf of a particular institution, mechanism, rule, or process is 
a fraught exercise, as the content of these terms can be difficult to pin down.  
Indeed, “legitimacy speak” has been soundly criticized by important 
international legal scholars for its indeterminacy and lack of substance.6  
Applying such conceptually slippery terms to the complex world of sovereign 
debt is no easy task. 
The goal of the remainder of this contribution, then, is relatively 
circumscribed.  It does not aim to formulate comprehensive or universal 
typologies of legitimacy and impartiality applicable across all arenas.7  Rather, 
 
 4. For an overview of possible distributional ramifications resulting from a decision to 
restructure (or the decision to delay restructuring), see Odette Lienau, The Longer-Term Consequences 
of Sovereign Debt Restructuring, in SOVEREIGN DEBT MANAGEMENT 85, 89–90 (Lee Buchheit & Rosa 
Lastra eds., 2014). For a discussion of both the practical problems with austerity measures and their 
intellectual history, see MARK BLYTH, AUSTERITY: THE HISTORY OF A DANGEROUS IDEA (2013). 
 5. See discussion infra, Part I.A. 
 6. James Crawford, The Problems of Legitimacy-Speak, 98 ASIL PROC. 271, 271 (2004) 
(noting the “fuzziness and indeterminacy” of the term); see also Martti Koskenniemi, Miserable 
Comforters: International Relations as New Natural Law, 15 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 395, 409 (2009) 
(suggesting that “[l]egitimacy is not about normative substance . . . . Its point is to avoid such substance 
but nonetheless to uphold a semblance of substance”). . 
 7. Indeed, understandings of legitimacy are necessarily variable and historically grounded.  
For a study of how shifts in conceptions of legitimacy ground systemic change in international society, 
see IAN CLARK, LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (2005).  Joseph Weiler suggests that forms of 
international lawmaking, including the legitimacy arguments with which they are associated, are best 
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it presents a preliminary working understanding of institutional features that 
might enhance the perception that debt restructuring practices are more (or less) 
legitimate and impartial in the current, complex global context.  The final 
elements ultimately incorporated into future debt restructurings are of course 
matters to be negotiated among key global stakeholders, involving decision-
making that necessarily attends to the broader goals of pragmatic feasibility, 
timeliness, and cost effectiveness. 
II.  BASICS AND THE BROAD AUDIENCE FOR LEGITIMACY 
As hinted at above, at the most general level, a rule, mechanism, norm, or 
institution can be understood as legitimate if it is considered worthy of 
voluntary compliance and/or support.  If a rule or mechanism is perceived as 
legitimate, then approval and compliance result at least in part from that 
assessment, rather than from coercion, habit, self-interest, or other possible 
reasons for action.8  Part of the special virtue or power of a legitimate rule thus 
lies in its capacity to coordinate preferences and decisions effectively even in 
the absence of other bases for action.  This quality becomes especially 
important in the international arena—including for a globally supported debt 
workout—where no supranational authority with broadly accepted powers of 
coercion exists.  As discussed more fully below, legitimacy may derive from 
the initial source of, ongoing process of, or ultimate substantive outcome 
resulting from a rule, mechanism, or institution, or from some combination of 
these three basic components. 
A.  The Broad Audience for Assessing Legitimacy 
The importance of legitimacy as a basis for action has long been 
recognized in the social sciences and in legal studies.  For example, Max 
Weber formulated a definition relevant for sociological theory to the effect that 
“a norm or institutional arrangement is legitimate if, as a matter of fact, it finds 
the approval of those who are supposed to live in this group.”9  Thomas Franck 
proposed a definition of legitimacy intended for international law and 
international relations, initially formulated to apply among states, as “a 
property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward 
compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe 
that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with 
generally accepted principles of right process.”10  In the last several decades, 
questions of the legitimacy of global governance have become even more 
central in both academic and policy writing, and scholars and activists have 
 
understood not as periodization but rather, drawing from geology, as stratification, in which sediments 
of past practices continue into the present.  Joseph H. H.Weiler, The Geology of International Law—
Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy, 64 ZAÖRV 547 (2004). 
 8. See, e.g., Christopher A. Thomas, The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International 
Law, 34 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 729 (2014). 
 9. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY, as 
quoted (and translated) in Lukas H. Meyer & Pranay Sanklecha, Introduction to Lukas H. Meyer, 
Legitimacy, Justice, and Public International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 2. 
 10. THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 24 (1990),. 
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built upon and extended these themes.11  In one recent influential article, Allen 
Buchanan and Robert Keohane emphasize that the concept of legitimacy 
appeals to a “common capacity to be moved by what might be called normative 
reasons,” and a “complex belief” that institutions may deserve support even if 
they fail to maximize self-interest and also fall short of (inevitably divergent) 
understandings of perfect justice.12 
Central to these formulations is the idea that conforming action is 
motivated by the legitimacy of the mechanism itself through the belief or 
normative approval of the relevant audience.  This interactive element leads to 
several preliminary implications.  First, the relevant audience for legitimacy 
purposes in any sovereign debt restructuring should ideally include all those 
actually affected by the restructuring—that is, all those who live in the group to 
which the applicable processes, mechanisms, or decisions apply.  This audience 
encompasses those without the position or power to enact or enforce rules, 
including citizens of countries undergoing a debt workout and small creditors 
who may have had minimal voice in the restructuring process.  This definition 
of the relevant audience accords with one of the general goals of establishing a 
legitimate order, which is to encourage voluntary adherence by all relevant 
actors to the extent possible.  This includes those individuals who may not have 
participated in either institutional design or particular restructuring processes, 
but who are nonetheless affected by their outcomes and who may therefore 
object to or impede implementation once decisions are made. The contention 
that a broad audience is relevant for assessing legitimacy does not mean that 
universal acceptance or adherence is required.  For example, it is possible that 
certain actors will remain intransigent even in the face of a rule, institution, or 
outcome generally determined to be legitimate, in which case opposition might 
well be considered illegitimate.  However, care should be taken when drawing 
these lines, particularly given the political import and distributional impact of 
claims about legitimacy or illegitimacy. 
B.  Components of Legitimacy: Source, Process, and Outcome 
The preceding discussion should make clear that determining one limited 
set of indicators for legitimacy would be overly simplistic, given the breadth 
and multiplicity of its audience.  Indeed, for any context and historical moment, 
legitimacy can be understood as “a composite of, and an accommodation 
between, a number of other norms, both procedural and substantive.”13  This 
section thus lays out key features that frequently play a part in claims about 
legitimacy.  Drawing from multiple schools of thought, there are three main 
approaches to legitimation.14  These, in turn, correspond to three questions 
 
 11. See, among others, JUTTA BRUNNÉE &STEPHEN TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010); MEYER, supra note 12; and RÜDIGER WOLFRUM & VOLKER RÖBEN, 
LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008) 
 12. Allen Buchanan & Robert Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions, in 
Rüdiger Wolfrum &Volker Röben, supra note 12, at 30, 31-32. 
 13. Clark, supra note 8, at 207. 
 14. This organizational framework and language is selected to be relatively simple, colloquial, 
and appropriate for the issue area. For related typologies applied in different applications, see Vivien A. 
Schmidt, Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and ‘Throughput’, 
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relevant for thinking through legitimacy in sovereign debt restructuring: 
Source Legitimacy: First, how are debt restructuring processes, or 
particular rules associated with these processes, to be formulated—and by 
whom?  A rule, mechanism, or institution may be considered more legitimate if 
its source and initial establishment satisfy the key values of the legitimating 
group. 
Process Legitimacy: Second, are the processes by which a sovereign debt 
restructuring unfolds in line with broadly accepted procedural standards?  The 
ongoing processes or procedures through which an institution works or a rule is 
implemented, as distinct from either the initial development of the rule or its 
results, may confer an additional and separate layer of legitimacy. 
Outcome or Substantive Legitimacy: Finally, is a sovereign debt 
restructuring able to generate successful outcomes, understood in terms of 
substantive goals?  Aside from considerations on the source or process front, an 
institution or rule may be considered legitimate if it generates desired 
outcomes.  Key follow-up questions here include how to define and determine 
positive substantive outcomes, and also who should make this assessment. 
Again, given the large and diverse audience for legitimacy, different 
groups will likely put more or less weight on particular levels or understandings 
of the concept.  Although this oversimplifies somewhat, a debt-restructuring 
regime that aims to incorporate key features drawn from each level may have 
the best chance of being considered more legitimate by a broader audience.  Of 
course, there can be tensions between particular legitimizing characteristics—
for example, maximum efficiency and broad participation—which would have 
to be balanced at both a general institutional level and within any particular 
debt workout situation.  To begin with, however, this section offers an 
overview of which elements actually merit consideration by sovereign debt 
negotiators attentive to legitimacy issues. 
1. Source (or Establishment) Legitimacy 
One central understanding of legitimacy involves a focus on how a 
practice, rule, mechanism, or rule-giving institution is originally established.  
To the extent that this initial establishment falls in line with core values of the 
applicable audience or community, the norm or regime may be considered 
more legitimate.  There are several possible ways to think through the 
legitimacy of debt restructuring practices at the source level. 
The classic legitimating mode in international law and global relations is 
state consent.  In this traditional view, states are considered the key creators of 
international law as well as their primary (and perhaps only) subjects.  Explicit 
state consent, for example in a treaty is necessary and in some cases sufficient 
for source legitimacy under this view.  Although this approach has been 
soundly criticized, in particular for failing to consider the legitimacy or 
illegitimacy of states themselves, it remains a widely acknowledged standard 
for source legitimacy in international law and global affairs.15 
 
61 POL. STUD. 2 (2013); and Thomas, supra note 9. 
 15. For criticisms of the state consent model, see Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 12, at 35-
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Democratic legitimation is a central legitimating framework in many 
nations, and is increasingly discussed at the global level as well.  Here, the 
legitimacy of a rule, mechanism, or governance body is only achieved if it is 
grounded in the support and input (either directly or through representatives) of 
the underlying people.  Such support, perhaps offered through majoritarian 
electoral institutions or other mechanisms, can legitimately bind even those not 
in favor of a particular rule.  One vision of global democracy might 
characterize all inhabitants of the globe as citizens, and attempt to aggregate 
their voices directly through a mechanism that bypasses states and other 
intermediaries.  However, this latter approach is far from workable at this point, 
even were it normatively desirable.  A general attentiveness to the voices of 
individuals (rather than only to states or other group entities), however, may 
offer some element of democratic legitimacy to sovereign debt restructurings. 
Participatory legitimation would aim for the participation of important 
(and potentially divergent) groups in sovereign debt restructurings.  Less 
demanding than strict democratic legitimation, this approach does not narrowly 
specify the identity of the stakeholders or the mechanism of participation and 
control.  However, it does mandate that a good faith effort be made to identify 
and involve an appropriately broad, or at least broadly representative, array of 
stakeholders through meaningful participatory mechanisms.16  Central to this 
legitimating element is the principle that participatory mechanisms should be 
impartial, not favoring or biased toward one particular group. 
Expertise or authority represents a final form of source legitimacy.  If 
accepted authority figures play central roles in developing rules or institutions, 
then the rules may be considered more legitimate.  Classic forms of authority-
based source legitimacy involve religious or moral codes; scientific, technical, 
or academic expertise; and traditional government. 
2. Process (or Implementation) Legitimacy 
A second level of legitimacy, which may complement other types, can be 
understood as process legitimacy.  Once a restructuring mechanism is actually 
established, the nature of its implementation and ongoing functioning may also 
affect perceptions of legitimacy.  In particular, processes that adhere to certain 
procedural standards, including those that guard impartiality (discussed as a 
 
36; Armin von Bogdandy & Matthias Goldmann, Sovereign Debt Restructurings as Exercises of 
International Public Authority, in CARLOS ESPOSITO, YUEFEN LI & JUAN PABLO BOHOSLAVSKY, 
SOVEREIGN FINANCING AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE UNCTAD PRINCIPLES ON RESPONSIBLE 
SOVEREIGN LENDING AND BORROWING 48 (eds., 2014).  However, Benedict Kingsbury highlights the 
distributional ramifications of a commitment to sovereign state equality and state consent, noting that “a 
decline in the traditional sovereign system weakens the relationship of mutual containment between 
sovereignty and inequality.” Benedict Kingsbury, Sovereignty and Inequality, in INEQUALITY, 
GLOBALIZATION, AND WORLD POLITICS, 92 (Andrew Hurrell & Ngaire Woods, eds., 1999).  And as 
Joseph Weiler points out, even those norms grounded in earlier ideological periods may still have some 
resonance today.  Weiler, supra note 7. 
 16. Along these lines, Terence Halliday highlights the potential importance of what he calls a 
representative basis for the legitimacy of international organizations, which involves “persuading 
prospective audiences that future products of an organization have been formulated by actors that share 
their interests or attributes.”  Terence C. Halliday, Legitimacy, Technology, and Leverage: The Building 
Blocks of Insolvency Architecture in the Decade Past and the Decade Ahead, 32 BROOKLYN J. OF INT’L 
L. 1084 (2006-2007). 
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separate principle below), may grant them greater legitimacy in the eyes of key 
constituents.  One caveat to keep in mind in terms of process, however, is that 
certain generally desirable elements—for example, broad participation and 
transparency—may be less feasible in specific emergency or crisis management 
situations.  As such, future discussions on sovereign debt restructuring might 
include a consideration of whether modified procedures are appropriate for 
such situations, and a mechanism for delineating when the application of a 
modified process would be warranted. 
In line with ideas of procedural fairness, the ongoing participation and 
input of affected individuals and groups, particularly before key decisions are 
made, could enhance the perceived legitimacy of sovereign debt restructurings.  
Such participation might work through either direct access or representative 
structures.  In order to ensure the presence of a broad array of voices, 
participatory processes can allow for input from third parties (such as NGOs) 
acting as amici curiae.  More specifically, this could involve the opportunity to 
be heard or provide comments on possible restructuring plans, the allowance of 
debt claims, and other issues.  The notice and comment procedures present in 
American administrative law, along with the claim allowance procedure in 
some domestic insolvency proceedings, could provide guidance on this front.  
And the mechanisms for ongoing participation would ideally strive to be 
impartial, not inappropriately privileging one or another viewpoint. 
One exception to this general preference for impartial procedures 
involves the idea of country ownership, which would allow a special 
attentiveness to the concerns of the sovereign debtor undergoing a 
restructuring.  “Ownership” of adjustment programs, particularly those 
mandated by International Financial Institutions (IFIs), has been considered an 
important element of process legitimacy in current sovereign debt restructuring 
practice and would be relevant going forward.  This comports with ongoing 
commitments to self-determination and sovereign control, which remain 
overarching principles in international law.  Like process legitimacy itself, 
country ownership also can have instrumental value.  As pointed out in a study 
of the challenges in reconciling country ownership with conditionality, 
“program ownership, by reflecting a firm commitment from the government, 
implies that the difficult policy measures . . . are more likely to be 
implemented.”17 
Comprehensiveness and full involvement present a particular challenge 
for any governance system, especially at the global level, where disparate 
parties often fail to take collective action.  This certainly is the case in 
sovereign debt issues, and scholars and policymakers have identified lack of 
creditor cooperation and forum fragmentation as central problems.18  The 
 
 17. Mohsin S. Khan & Sunil Sharma, Reconciling Conditionality and Country Ownership, 39 
FIN. & DEV. no. 2 (June 2002); see also J.H. Johnson, Borrower Ownership of Adjustment Programs 
and the Political Economy of Reform, World Bank Discussion Paper No. 199 (1992). 
 18. See, for example, UNCTAD, Debt Workout Mechanism Framing Paper, 2 September 
2013, at 3.  Available at: 
http://www.unctad.info/upload/Framing%20Paper%2027%20August_finalwithlogo.pdf. Framing 
Document. See also UNCTAD, Sovereign Debt Workouts: Going Forward. Roadmap and Guide (2015) 
at http://www.unctad.info/en/Debt-Portal. 
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formulation and successful implementation of procedures that address these 
problems would thus be especially relevant to perceptions of process legitimacy 
in future sovereign debt restructurings.  The goal here is to ensure not just the 
opportunity to participate, but also to ensure that all relevant parties in fact do 
participate to the extent possible.  This element of comprehensiveness is likely 
to have an impact on outcome legitimacy as well, as full involvement by 
relevant parties is more likely to result in a final resolution of debt claims, a 
return to economic growth, and an enhanced capacity to access capital markets 
at better rates. 
Transparency has value in and of itself and also supports many other 
elements associated with process legitimacy.19  To begin with, it is a 
precondition for ongoing participation and honest communication, as it allows 
for the dissemination of information and restructuring proposals about which 
parties may have views.  Furthermore, it allows stakeholders to determine 
whether an institution or mechanism functions in line with its goals and is 
likely to result in positive outcomes.  It is thus unsurprising that agencies 
involved in global governance, including the IMF and the World Bank, have 
tried to become more transparent, albeit sometimes in response to significant 
external pressure. 
Reason-giving, that is, clarifying the reasons for particular decisions, 
includes providing the analytical and informational or evidentiary foundations 
underpinning final outcomes.20  Closely related to transparency, reason-giving 
helps to ensure that the views of various stakeholders have in fact been taken 
into account, and that improper bases for decision-making have not impacted 
the outcome. 
Efficiency of procedures also constitutes one element of process or 
implementation legitimacy.  Parties will be more likely to accept an institution, 
rule, or mechanism if the procedures with which it is associated do not divert 
undue resources, time, and attention away from the pursuit of other important 
goals.  This element also implicates outcome legitimacy, as even generally 
positive results, such as a return to debt sustainability or the achievement of 
satisfactory levels of socio-economic rights, will be undermined if they are not 
achieved in a reasonably timely fashion.21 
 
 19. Matthias Goldmann, “Good Faith and Transparency in Sovereign Debt Workouts,” Paper 
Prepared for the Second Session of the UNCTAD Working Group on a Debt Workout Mechanism, 23 
January 2014.  See especially 17-23.  In addition, it has been highlighted as a general principle of Global 
Administrative Law and an important emerging feature of international law and global governance.  See 
Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, & Richard B. Stewart, “The Emergence of Global Administrative 
Law,” Law & Contemporary Problems, vol. 68, 15-61 (2005), 37-39; Andrea Bianchi and Anne Peters, 
Transparency in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013); Alexandru Grigorescu, 
“Transparency of Intergovernmental Organizations,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 51 (2007). 
 20. The importance of reason-giving in an international adjudicatory setting is accepted in, for 
example, the statute of the International Court of Justice, which states in article 56(1) that “[t]he 
judgment shall state the reasons on which it is based.” Statute of the I.C.J., art. 56(1). Armin von 
Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke note that reason-giving permits “decisions to be discursively embedded and 
to be critiqued before the court of public opinion.” Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, On the 
Democratic Legitimation of International Lawmaking, 12 GERMAN L. J. 1341, 1343 (2011). 
 21. The phrasing of Principle 15 of the UNCTAD Principles on Promoting Responsible 
Sovereign Lending and Borrowing, which requires that any restructuring “should be undertaken 
promptly, efficiently, and fairly,” very explicitly incorporates this element.  UNCTAD, Principles on 
Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing, 10 January 2012.  Available at: 
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Finally, the possibility of review by an external entity of the procedures 
and decisions implicated in a debt restructuring may help to support fair and 
impartial processes as well as outcome legitimacy.  Improper biases or 
procedural irregularities could be corrected or compensated for, responding to 
those dissatisfied by particular outcomes or at least ensuring that their specific 
concerns have been heard.  Perhaps more important, the possibility of review 
can heighten internal monitoring, encouraging parties and decision makers to 
more closely scrutinize their own actions, and thus magnifying the impact of all 
of the other elements associated with process legitimacy just discussed. In 
addition, external review may help to ensure that restructuring outcomes 
comply with central principles and objectives. 
3. Outcome or Substantive Legitimacy 
A final set of standards relevant to the perceived legitimacy of a 
restructuring would involve its ability to generate successful outcomes, 
understood in terms of substantive goals.  The capacity of a rule, institution, or 
mechanism to produce results that satisfy the needs or desires of constituents 
will almost always confer an important degree of legitimacy.22  While it is 
unlikely that any institution or rule could produce absolutely optimal outcomes, 
however defined, the restructuring in question would still need to meet a 
minimum threshold of success to be acceptable.23  The type of outcome that 
characterizes ‘success’ necessarily varies across issue area, but several 
possibilities are especially relevant for a sovereign debt restructuring. 
Positive economic and financial results will feature importantly in the 
perceived outcome legitimacy of any debt workout.  From the sovereign debtor 
perspective, a successful restructuring outcome would involve a return to debt 
sustainability and economic growth,24 and perhaps also an eventual 
improvement in creditworthiness and a return to capital market access.  From a 
creditor perspective, it would involve reasonable recovery on an investment.  
Outcome considerations calibrated according to more specific standards—for 
instance, approaches associated with “global justice” advocated by certain 
groups—may consider other economic results to be desirable, such as global 
redistribution of wealth.  Asset recovery may also feature as a desirable 
financial outcome and could partially relieve the need for creditor losses or 
harsh austerity measures. 
Basic human impact in the debtor country would also serve as a basis for 
evaluating any restructuring.  Under this broad rubric, alternative approaches 
might focus on a simple concern for basic well-being or on the active 
improvement of outcomes for individuals in terms of a more expansive 
 
http://www.unctad.info/upload/Debt%20Portal/Principles%20drafts/SLB_Principles_English_Doha_22-
04-2012.pdf. 
 22. In the EU context, this is called “output legitimacy” by Fritz Scharpf, Vivien Schmidt, and 
others.  Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe (Oxford University Press, 1999); Vivien Schmidt, n. 14. 
 23. Buchanan and Keohane refer to this more instrumental perspective as a concern with 
“comparative benefit” as compared to other possible institutions (or presumably as compared to the 
absence of an institution, if that is the alternative).  Buchanan and Keohane, n. 12, 46-47. 
 24. On the concept of debt sustainability, see Bohoslavsky and Goldmann, note 1. 
2016] Legitimacy and Impartiality as Basic Principles 107 
  
conception of human rights.  In addition, there may be questions as to which 
standards are sufficiently established and internationally appropriate to ground 
outcome judgments.25  Adherence to other substantive principles or doctrines 
may also be relevant to judging outcomes.  These might include unclean hands, 
unconscionability, fraudulent transfer, and concerns about governmental 
responsiveness to and responsibility for underlying populations. 
Consistency across cases provides one final feature that could be 
associated with perceptions of outcome legitimacy.  Such consistency would 
enhance the predictability and stability of markets, a benefit for both sovereign 
borrowers and investors alike.  Forum fragmentation and variations in (and 
possibly inconsistent interpretations of) the laws, principles, and procedures 
that apply to debt restructurings currently undermine this consistency.  That 
said, as a cautionary note, it is important to keep in mind that the consistent 
application of a problematic practice—perhaps leading to uniformly 
substandard results—is not necessarily favorable in and of itself.  As such, 
consistency perhaps should be understood as a subsidiary element.  In addition, 
given the political, social, and economic variability that can exist among 
sovereign debt situations, any restructuring should likely not focus on 
consistency at the expense of attentiveness to the situation at hand. 
III.  THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPARTIALITY 
A central companion to and support for legitimacy in the international 
arena is the ideal of impartiality.  Indeed, I consider impartiality to be a core 
factor underpinning the more comprehensive category of legitimacy, as well as 
a valuable principle in its own right.  Particularly in the context of decision-
making bodies such as tribunals, impartiality and independence have been 
called “the most important determinant of political legitimacy at the 
international level,” with legitimacy requiring that such bodies “be sufficiently 
independent of the powerful actors that dominate the political sphere to take 
less powerful and minority interests into consideration.”26  Thus, although 
impartiality has already been implicated in several of the legitimating features 
mentioned above, it deserves further explication.  I organize the bulk of this 
brief discussion into a consideration of institutional impartiality, actor 
impartiality, and what I call informational impartiality. 
A.  Basic Definition 
Generally speaking, impartiality can be understood as a way of thinking, 
decision-making or acting that is free of bias or preference and that is 
grounded in independence and objectivity.27  It is an essential component of 
 
 25. Along these lines, Buchanan and Keohane refer to “minimal moral acceptability” and a 
“non-violation of human rights.”  Buchanan and Keohane, n. 12, 46. 
 26. Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, “Prospects for the Increased Independence of 
International Tribunals,” German Law Journal, vol. 12, no. 5, 1057-1082 (2011), 1058. 
 27. Steven Ratner, for example, describes impartiality as “a way that individuals and 
institutions decide and act, one based on disinterestedness, consistency, and fairness and not merely 
personal motives.”  Steven R. Ratner, “Do international organizations play favorites? An impartialist 
account,” in Meyer, ed., n. 11, 128. 
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colloquial understandings of justice and fairness.  Impartiality may be 
compromised by biases or preferences grounded in national, regional, political, 
ideological, or personal affiliation.  Although these biases are perhaps most 
easily cognizable in how individuals think and act, they can also impact how 
institutions or institutionalized practices are established and can therefore affect 
their goals and operating processes. 
As a central underpinning of legitimacy, impartiality plays a role not only 
through actual objectivity and independence, but also through perceptions and 
acknowledgment of objectivity and independence by relevant constituencies.  
In other words, the interactive element of legitimacy contemplated above 
translates to impartiality as well.28  Although complete impartiality (like 
universal legitimacy) is perhaps impossible to achieve, impartiality remains an 
important factor to consider in any sovereign debt workout. 
B.  Elements of Impartiality 
To maximize institutional impartiality, any sovereign debt restructuring 
should be organized to avoid systematic bias in favor of one or another 
interested group.  One key sub-feature that could support this larger goal is 
institutional independence: the organizations and mechanisms involved in a 
workout ideally would minimize their affiliation with groups or actors that 
might be affected by the restructuring processes.  This separation might include 
attentiveness to financial independence, personnel independence, and perhaps 
physical independence (such as through geographic location in a neutral 
setting).  This would be especially important to the extent that any restructuring 
regime eventually involves a more permanent organization.  Transparency-
enhancing and review procedures, discussed above, could enhance this type of 
impartiality by making an institution’s inner workings more visible to 
interested parties, and by serving as a check on those procedures. 
To the extent that any debt restructuring involves a central role for third 
party decision-makers, whether serving as mediators, facilitators, or 
adjudicators, it would be important to ensure actor impartiality as well.  
Perhaps the central feature of actor impartiality involves independence, or 
ensuring that decision makers and mediators remain independent of the 
negotiating parties, both individually and as a group (in multi-party decision-
making situations).29  As part of actor impartiality, decision maker disclosure 
requirements may be appropriate.  Furthermore, requiring decision makers to 
specify the rationale for any conclusion through processes of reasoned 
judgment can help to support actor impartiality.  This practice ensures that 
decision makers clarify for themselves that the underlying analysis is impartial, 
and also allows other actors to provide a check on any bias that may exist.  
Finally, the use of multi-person decision-making may help to mitigate actor 
 
 28. The desirability of drawing from a plurality of traditions and standards, discussed in the 
context of legitimacy above, is applicable to the principle of impartiality as well, given that it will be 
judged by the same multiple audiences. 
 29. This gives rise to the expectation or requirement, in many domestic and international 
judicial settings, of judicial decision-makers recusing themselves from cases in which they may be 
biased or be perceived to be biased. 
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bias, as decisions will have to be discussed and justified.  This depends, of 
course, on a balanced initial selection of individuals, as well as on a 
commitment on the part of these individuals to think and act as impartially as 
possible. 
A third dimension of impartiality includes what I call informational 
impartiality, or the impartiality of informational inputs.  Although information 
may be presented as objective, such inputs can embed biases or preferences in 
subtle ways.  This can affect both a restructuring outcome and also the final 
opinion or assessment of its success.  Indicators constitute one central 
informational input into any sovereign debt restructuring, and recent work has 
highlighted the economic and legal aspects of the use of indicators in a 
potential debt workout mechanism.30  In addition, social science models, which 
predict the likely outcomes of restructurings and related domestic measures (in 
terms of GDP growth, social costs, and other metrics), can feature importantly 
in any sovereign debt decision.  They may be used by debtors, creditors, and 
other decision makers to determine the ex ante feasibility of a particular 
restructuring plan, and in particular to determine the extent of relief necessary 
to return a debtor to sustainability.  Although such models are no doubt 
presented in good faith, they can fail to characterize the situation fully and may 
thus favor one or another group in a debt crisis, even when relevant actors and 
institutions aim for independence and objectivity in their assessments.31  The 
question of which models and methodologies are appropriate, and of who 
should make this selection, can thus be quite controversial.  As such, care 
should be taken to ensure that the selection and use of social science models 
reflects an understanding of their political character and distributional 
ramifications.32 
IV.  FOUNDATIONS IN DOMESTIC INSOLVENCY PRINCIPLES 
To what degree are elements of legitimacy and impartiality already 
incorporated into areas related to sovereign debt restructuring?  In this and the 
following Sections, I look at two regimes with important parallels to sovereign 
debt in order to imagine how future workouts might incorporate features 
associated with these principles.  In this section, I focus on domestic insolvency 
and debt restructuring institutions, primarily as interpreted through the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Legislative 
 
 30. Michael Riegner, “Legal frameworks and general principles for indicators in sovereign 
debt restructuring,” in this issue; Jasper Lukkezen and Hugo Romagossa, “Early warning indicators in a 
debt restructuring mechanism,” UNCTAD Working Group Paper (2014). 
 31. In the first days of 2013, IMF chief economist Olivier Blanchard co-published a working 
paper (interpreted as a mea culpa) suggesting the organization had misjudged and underestimated the 
negative effect of austerity measures on growth in European countries during the crisis.  See Olivier 
Blanchard and Daniel Leigh, “Growth Forecast Errors and Fiscal Multipliers,” IMF Working Paper No. 
13/1, 3 January 2013; Howard Schneider, “An Amazing Mea Culpa from the IMF’s Chief Economist on 
Austerity,” Washington Post online, 3 January 2013. 
 32. This insight is central to the discipline of international political economy.  For volumes 
emphasizing the contingent and politically conditioned nature of economic models, see Jonathan 
Kirshner, ed., Monetary Orders: Ambiguous Economics, Ubiquitous Politics (Cornell University Press, 
2003); Rawi Abdelal, Mark Blyth, and Craig Parsons, eds., Constructing the International Economy 
(Cornell University Press, 2010). 
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Guide on Insolvency.  I then consider rules covering two adjudicative bodies 
involved with investor-state arbitration. 
While the development and study of comparative insolvency law as a 
standalone field is relatively recent,33 the last decades have seen an explosion 
of interest in promoting and harmonizing the rules and mechanisms governing 
insolvency.  Perhaps the most comprehensive and successful effort to formulate 
both shared principles for insolvency and possible models for their 
implementation culminated in the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on 
Insolvency, initially published in 2005.34  Given significant similarities with the 
sovereign debt situation, it is notable that features designed to promote 
legitimacy and impartiality play a central role in both UNCITRAL’s collective 
effort to identify best practices as well as in domestic insolvency proceedings 
themselves. 
A.  Legitimacy Concerns 
To begin with, the UNCITRAL guide itself was developed on the basis of 
representation and through the auspices of a working group attuned to source 
legitimacy concerns.35  This representation involved official and observer state 
delegations, international financial institutions, international governance 
organizations, and professional associations.  Expert-based source legitimacy 
also derived from the involvement of these professional associations, along 
with the use of experts from practice, academia, policy, and other arenas in 
more ad hoc drafting sessions.  General state consent to the process and to the 
product was offered through General Assembly Resolution 59/40,36 though of 
course the actual enactment and implementation of insolvency laws work 
through the national level. 
Domestic insolvency proceedings tend to place considerable emphasis on 
process legitimacy and procedural fairness, including impartiality, which may 
be understood as a norm applicable to insolvency more generally and thus 
translatable to the global level as well.  One of the key objectives of insolvency 
procedures, as laid out in the UNCITRAL Guide, is to provide for a “timely, 
 
 33. Particularly since the 1970s, there has been serious attention paid to this field at the 
national level, with authoritative study groups and committees formulating principles and 
recommendations for modernizing bankruptcy/insolvency policy and legislation.  See, for example, the 
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States (1970, partially leading to the major 1978 
reforms of federal bankruptcy legislation); Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency (‘Cork 
Report,’ 1982); Report of the Canadian Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency (‘Colter 
Report’, 1986); Australian Law Reform Commission’s Report No. 45: General Insolvency Inquiry 
(‘Harmer Report,’ 1988). 
 34. The foundational text of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide is available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf.  For a fascinating overview of 
its developments, as well as the ways that global-local tensions can result in implementation gaps, see 
Terence C. Halliday and Bruce G. Carruthers, Bankrupt: Global Lawmaking and Systemic Financial 
Crisis (Stanford, 2009). 
 35. This attentiveness to legitimacy was deepened because of UNCITRAL’s recognition that it 
had been brought into the process in part due to the legitimacy problems of other institutions, in 
particular the IMF and the World Bank (due to suspicion of their activities among some developing 
countries and their association with Washington, D.C.), INSOL and the IBA (primarily insolvency and 
legal practitioners, respectively, with professional biases and associated pecuniary interests); and the 
regional development banks.  Halliday & Carruthers, id., 128-129. 
 36. United Nations General Assembly, A/Res/59/40 (2 December 2004). 
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efficient and impartial resolution of insolvency.”37  The Guide further 
emphasizes the centrality of transparency, noting that enacted laws should 
“[e]nsure a transparent and predictable insolvency law that contains incentives 
for gathering and dispensing information.”38  In every jurisdiction, debtors can 
voluntarily commence insolvency proceedings, which presumably helps to 
encourage ownership of the process.  To balance this debtor control, some 
jurisdictions require an eligibility determination before the insolvency 
mechanism is technically triggered and applicable standstill provisions, or stays 
on collection and litigation, are put in place.39  Broadening the range of 
participation, domestic insolvency proceedings ideally seek to provide fair 
process and a right to be heard for creditors whose claims will be determined 
and possibly curtailed.  Given the large number of creditors involved in some 
insolvency proceedings, many national jurisdictions contemplate the use of 
committees as a mode of participation.  However, the Guide notes that steps 
should be taken to ensure that such committees are truly representative and 
impartial as to the interests of its members, for example by disallowing the 
appointment of unduly partial creditors to a committee.40 
In addition, comprehensiveness is central to perceptions of legitimacy in 
domestic insolvency systems.  A distinctive feature of insolvency law is its 
recognition of a debtor’s inability to pay creditors as a group, as opposed to just 
one particular creditor.  Insolvency legislation thus deals with unsustainable 
debt on a collective basis.41  This collective element means that to an important 
degree creditors may be in tension with one another rather than only with the 
debtor.  But creditors as a whole should gain from cooperation, as compared to 
a situation in which each seeks payment for itself but risks the prospect of 
complete nonpayment in the event of coming late to the game.  As such, to the 
extent that creditors intend to make any claim on the debtor’s assets, their 
participation in the process is required.  This fact ensures a high degree of 
involvement, and is accompanied by procedures that allow for the full 
participation of interested creditors or creditor groups, at least through 
representation.  In the words of Rosalind Mason, “insolvency law features the 
notion of collective impartiality . . . [because] there is a moratorium on creditor 
action and proceedings and a consolidation of the conduct of litigation.  
Individual claims are addressed through the collective administration, which 
balances the disparate interests of the various parties.”42 
In terms of outcome, the UNCITRAL Guide, as well as most national 
insolvency procedures, sets a baseline of acceptable creditor recovery.  The 
 
 37. Recommendation 1(e), at 14. 
 38. Recommendation 1(g), at 14. 
 39. There is also variation in the availability and strength of involuntary proceedings.  In any 
case, given the special sovereignty and autonomy concerns at the sovereign debt level, these would not 
be relevant. 
 40. See, for example, UNCITRAL Guide Recommendation 131, at 204. 
 41. Thus creditors may conflict with one another, as well as the debtor.  For one early 
overview, see Elizabeth Warren, “Bankruptcy Policy,” University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 54, 775 
(1987), esp. 780-789. 
 42. Rosalind Mason, Cross-Border Insolvency Law: Where Private International Law and 
Insolvency Law Meet,” in Paul Omar, ed., International Insolvency Law: Themes and Perspectives 
(Ashgate, 2008), 32. 
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first key objective of the Guide, namely achieving a balance between 
liquidation and reorganization, includes the provision that in any restructuring 
“creditors would not involuntarily receive less than in liquidation.”43  Given the 
non-applicability of financially liquidating a sovereign state, this is difficult to 
translate.  However, it relates to the general requirement that creditors be 
treated in good faith, and that they not be required to accept a lower payout 
than is necessary for the debtor’s recovery.  On the debtor side, as a general 
matter, restructuring plans in insolvency proceedings should not be agreed to or 
confirmed (to the extent that court confirmation is required) unless they are 
likely to actually rehabilitate the debtor in question.44  Thus a restructuring plan 
considered to be “too little” for the debtor problems at issue would not be 
considered outcome-legitimate, and therefore likely should not be confirmed or 
agreed to under general insolvency principles. 
Many states have ratified the major human rights conventions, which 
could be considered an element of outcome legitimacy (as well as binding 
international law).  Indeed, the UNCITRAL Guide notes that, in determining 
whether a natural person debtor’s assets should be excluded from creditor 
recovery, “consideration might need to be given to applicable human rights 
obligations” in order to “allow for the minimum necessary to preserve the 
personal rights of the debtor [and relevant family members] and allow the 
debtor to lead a productive life.”45  The more general implication could be that 
human rights should be protected regardless of how natural persons are situated 
in an insolvency—that is, regardless of whether individuals are situated as 
debtors themselves or are simply among those impacted by a sovereign state 
debtor’s restructuring.46 
B.  Impartiality in Insolvency 
While process legitimacy, with its implication of impartiality, is a core 
element of domestic insolvency proceedings, impartiality also features as a 
central and independent principle of insolvency in its own right.  In terms of 
institutional impartiality, there is considerable variation among states in the 
organizational settings for insolvency proceedings.  Civil law countries like 
France, for example, mandate significant court involvement for any major 
decision.  At the other end of the spectrum, Australia advocates that debtors 
dealing with insolvency avoid court oversight to the extent possible.  While the 
UNCITRAL Guide remains neutral, it does specify that “competent and 
 
 43. UNCITRAL Guide (2004), 14-15.  Quoted in Halliday & Carruthers, n. 34, 141. 
 44. In the U.S. Chapter 11 context, for example, a court may not confirm a reorganization plan 
unless it meets the requirement of feasibility, in that it is not likely to result in an eventual liquidation.  
See 11. U.S. §1129. 
 45. UNCITRAL Guide, Part II, A, para. 19, at 80.  Additional references to human rights 
along these lines may be found in Part III, A., paras. 19 & 29.  Para. 19 notes that the rights of “a natural 
person debtor in insolvency proceedings may be affected by obligations under international and regional 
treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention 
on Human Rights.” 
 46. Human impact more generally can be considered relevant in insolvency proceedings.  For 
example, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides exceptions to the general rule that unsecured debts will be 
discharged in liquidation.  However, even these exceptions may be excused if continued debt payment 
would constitute “undue hardship” for the debtor.  See 11 U.S. Code §523(a)(8). 
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independent” courts should be available as a neutral background institution. 
Even greater focus is placed on actor impartiality, particularly given that 
the Guide contemplates (but does not mandate) the appointment of an 
“insolvency representative” such as a trustee, administrator, or judicial manager 
to oversee the proceedings.  Any such individual must not only be 
knowledgeable but also have the attributes of “integrity, impartiality, and 
independence.”47  The Guide recommends that any insolvency law “require the 
disclosure of a conflict of interest, a lack of independence or circumstances that 
may lead to a conflict of interest or lack of independence” and also that this 
obligation “continue throughout the insolvency proceedings.”48 
In short, domestic insolvency law, and particularly UNCITRAL’s 
clarification of globally applicable and accepted insolvency law principles, 
emphasizes features associated with claims about legitimacy and impartiality.  
In so doing, these sources demonstrate a number of practices that might 
enhance the perceived legitimacy and impartiality of future debt restructurings 
at the sovereign level. 
V.  EFFORTS TOWARD IMPARTIALITY AND LEGITIMACY IN INVESTOR TREATY 
ARBITRATION 
Investor treaty arbitration lends additional support for attending to 
characteristics associated with legitimacy and impartiality.  Such arbitration, 
which may be incorporated into hard law instruments such as bilateral 
investment treaties or concession contracts, directly involves sovereign states 
and investors.  By its nature such arbitration is ad hoc and not built upon 
systems of precedent, and some observers raise serious concerns about 
inconsistency, bias, and other problems.  Even more troubling charges have 
been made that such arbitration may be systematically biased in favor of 
investor claimants.49  Nonetheless, certain procedural rules in these arbitrations 
 
 47. UNCITRAL Guide, Recommendation 115, at 188. 
 48. UNCITRAL Guide, Recommendations 116 & 117, at 188.  Less explicit attention is paid 
to informational impartiality in domestic insolvency proceedings.  However, as part of general process 
requirements, parties to insolvency proceedings are often allowed to offer expert opinions and testimony 
to support their projections of the likelihood of success (or of the value of particular assets, etc.) and also 
challenge the claims made by opposing stakeholders (for example, of the likely effect of a plan or plan 
provisions). 
 49. Gus Van Harten, for example, suggests that “the system is flawed, above all because it 
submits the sovereign authority and budgets of states to formal control by adjudicators who may be 
suspected—because they are untenured and because only one class of parties can bring claims—of 
interpreting investment treaties broadly in order to expand the system’s appeal to potential claimants 
and, in turn, their own prospects for future appointment.”  Van Harten acknowledges that certain 
arbitrators may develop reputations for fairness and balance, but suggests that there is nonetheless “an 
unreliable bias.”  Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2007), vii.  See also Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet, “Profiting from Injustice: How Law Firms, 
Arbitrators, and Financiers are Fuelling an Investment Arbitration Boom,” (Corporate Europe 
Observatory and the Transnational Institute, Nov. 2012).  UNCTAD has also highlighted concerns with 
the current investor-state dispute settlement regime and laid out advantages and disadvantages to five 
potential paths to reform.  See UNCTAD, “Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of a 
Roadmap,” IIA Issues Note, June 2013; available at: 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf.  For a response to critics and a 
defense of the basic contours of the current system, see Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, “From 
‘Dealing in Virtue’ to ‘Profiting from Injustice’: The Case Against ‘Re-Stratification’ of Investment 
Dispute Resolution,” Harvard International Law Journal Online, vol. 55 (January 2014). 
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offer insight into how characteristics designed to enhance legitimacy are 
broadly incorporated and acknowledged to be desirable, even in this 
controversial arena and even when not fully successful.  Two sets of rules 
commonly used, and thus referred to in this section, are the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Rules and the UNCITRAL 
Rules. 
A.  Impartiality 
To begin with, it is important to highlight that one of the central 
purported benefits of arbitration is that parties enjoy a greater degree of control 
over the proceedings than in a conventional judicial dispute resolution setting.  
As such, by design, there is a lower degree of institutional independence in 
both the ICSID and UNCITRAL Rules than in standard domestic court settings.  
For example, the parties pay the arbitrators directly and have significant control 
over the arbitral location.50 
Still, some attention is paid to supporting process legitimacy through a 
degree of attentiveness to actor impartiality, particularly in the selection of 
arbitrators.  ICSID rule 6(2) requires that all arbitrators sign a declaration of 
independence in advance of the first session that lists any factors that might 
compromise their impartiality.51  In addition, article 39 of the ICSID 
Convention specifies that the majority of arbitrators be citizens of states other 
than the claimant-investor’s home state and the respondent state.  Similarly, in 
the event that the parties are unable to arrange a panel independently, 
arbitrators appointed by the Chairman of ICSID’s Administrative Council must 
not be nationals of either the state party or the home state of the claimant-
investor.52  Finally, the default procedures for ICSID stipulate a three-person 
tribunal, with each party appointing one arbitrator and then agreeing on a third, 
who serves as the panel’s president.53 
The basic orientation is very similar under the UNCITRAL Rules.  Both 
prospective and appointed arbitrators have an ongoing duty to disclose 
circumstances that may raise doubts as to their impartiality or independence.54  
Although the UNCITRAL Rules do not specify nationality requirements for 
arbitrators, they do mandate that the appointing authority consider “the 
advisability of appointing an arbitrator of a nationality other than the 
nationalities of the parties.”55  The UNCITRAL Rules also presume (but do not 
require) that three individuals will be appointed to the arbitration panel.  Each 
 
 50. However, given the absence of a standing institution with full-time professional decision-
makers, there is arguably less of a risk that a longstanding and deep-seated institutional bias would 
develop. 
 51. ICSID Rule 6(2).  Note that ICSID maintains a pre-screened Panel of Arbitrators 
considered to have sufficient expertise and professionalism to be appropriate.  However, parties may 
select arbitrators that are not on this list and so additional safeguards of impartiality have been put in 
place. 
 52. ICSID Convention Art. 38. 
 53. ICSID Convention Art. 37(2)(b); ICSID Rule 3. 
 54. UNCITRAL Rev. Art. 11.  An annex to the UNCITRAL Rules even provides model 
“Statements of Independence” that can be used by arbitrators. 
 55. UNCITRAL Art. 6(4). 
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party appoints one arbitrator, and then the two initial appointees consult and 
jointly select a third.56 
Commentators have charged that even these procedures fall short and that 
problems are more endemic.57  Critics note that, in any case, the parties have 
not followed the processes sufficiently to rid investor state dispute settlement of 
bias or the perception of bias.58  Nonetheless, these institutional features clearly 
are designed to promote the goal and general principle of impartiality.  They 
therefore can provide a guideline—or perhaps a baseline—for thinking through 
elements that might support perceptions of impartiality in future sovereign debt 
restructurings. 
B.  Legitimacy 
Although impartiality is in itself a core legitimating element in investor-
state arbitration, other features mentioned in the conceptual discussion of 
legitimacy in Section 3 above are present as well.  As just noted in the 
overview of impartiality and investor-state arbitration, party ownership and 
control—important elements in understandings of legitimacy—are especially 
central in investor-state arbitration.  Given the limited number of parties 
generally involved, their equal participation is less of a problem than it might 
be in other settings.  And, notably, a series of amendments to the ICSID Rules 
in 2006 aimed to improve the transparency and participatory element of 
proceedings even for non-parties.  In particular, rule 37 makes possible 
submissions by “non-disputing parties” through amici curiae, rule 32 covers the 
possibility of making hearings open to the public, and rule 48 governs the 
publication of awards.59 
In regard to efficiency, the ICSID Rules specify that a tribunal should be 
constituted “as soon as possible” and “with all possible dispatch” after an 
arbitration is requested, with a series of time frames for arbitrator 
appointments.60  The UNCITRAL Rules similarly note a time window for 
constituting the tribunal and appointing arbitrators, specifying that the 
appointing authority is required to make the election “as promptly as 
possible.”61  However, under both processes there exists the possibility of 
manipulation and delay by the parties, particularly through the process of 
appointing (and objecting to) arbitrators.  As such, the process ownership and 
 
 56. Parties may also agree on a sole arbitrator, or on the appointing authority for a sole 
arbitrator, with the Secretary General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration serving as the default in the 
event that the parties fail to reach agreement.  UNCITRAL Art. 6. 
 57. Van Harten, n. 49; Eberhardt & Olivet, n. 49. 
 58. One much remarked upon ICSID arbitration is that of Vivendi II, in which an ad hoc 
committee reviewing a tribunal’s decision criticized one of the arbitrators for failing to disclose her 
board position at a bank holding shares in the claimant investor, but ultimately upheld the award.  
Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/97/3) (Annulment Proceeding) (10 August 2010).  See especially para. 231-232. 
 59. Jason Yackee and Jarrod Wong review these amendments in detail, and generally consider 
them to be “modest, incremental, and conservative.”  Jason W. Yackee & Jarrod Wong, “The 2006 
Procedural and Transparency-Related Amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules,” in Yearbook on 
International Investment Law & Policy, Karl. P. Sauvant, ed., ch. 6 (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
 60. See ICSID Convention Article 37(1); ICSID Rule 1. 
 61. UNCITRAL Art. 6(3). 
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consent elements of investment treaty arbitration may undermine efficiency.62 
As with domestic insolvency, the rules governing investor treaty 
arbitration do value several mechanisms associated with process legitimacy.  
Although this incorporation is neither complete nor entirely successful, it does 
indicate the degree to which these design elements are held in high regard and 
broadly utilized.  It also offers more specific ideas for incorporating features 
associated with legitimacy claims into potential future sovereign debt 
restructurings. 
CONCLUSION 
This essay has suggested that attentiveness to the principles of legitimacy 
and impartiality may contribute to the instrumental success of any sovereign 
debt restructuring, and has highlighted institutional elements or practices often 
associated with these goals.  An additional question can be raised as to whether 
these principles might have a further claim to special consideration, as part of 
emerging customary international law or general principles of law.  Any 
determination along these lines is made difficult by the fact that legitimacy is a 
composite principle, constituted of multiple procedural and substantive norms, 
and perhaps lacks the necessary specificity to be a legal rule itself.63  
Impartiality also is a multi-faceted ideal, though it links so deeply to 
understandings of legal rule that it may well constitute a general principle of 
international law in certain adjudicative settings.  Regardless, both legitimacy 
and impartiality can be understood as background guiding principles in 
international and domestic legal regimes alike.  As such, they can help to orient 
the formulation of more specific rules and decision-making procedures in 
sovereign debt restructuring going forward. 
Of course, neither principle can be achieved perfectly in any institutional 
setting, particularly given the need to balance goals of political feasibility, 
timeliness, and cost effectiveness.  And, pragmatically speaking, neither works 
on a binary basis—few institutions or practices are either perfectly legitimate 
and impartial or entirely illegitimate and partial.  Given that compliance with 
each is a matter of degree, one goal in thinking through incremental 
improvements in sovereign debt restructuring could be to eventually 
incorporate as many features associated with legitimacy and impartiality as 
possible.  This objective might ground negotiations to establish more rational, 
coherent, and broadly supported sovereign debt practices for the future. 
 
 
 62. For a brief description of delay tactics from a practitioner perspective, Stephen Jagusch & 
Jeffrey Sullivan, “A Comparison of ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration: Areas of Divergence and 
Concern,” in Claire Balchin, Liz Kyo-Hwa Chung, Asha Kaushal & Michael Waibel, eds., The Backlash 
against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality, 79, 84-85 (Kluwer 2010).  Note that this refers 
to a previous version of the UNCITRAL Rules, but the themes remain pertinent. 
 63. Customary international law, accepted in key international documents as one potential 
source of law (along with treaties and general legal principles), is identified through “evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law.”  The emergence of customary international law on a topic can be 
demonstrated by the existence of relevant state practice in conjunction with a sense of legal obligation 
(opinio juris) – the belief on the part of the acting state that the practice is required by law.  ICJ Article 
38(1). 
